Dystopian Framework of Sir Thomas More’s Utopia, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984: A Foucauldian Discourse Reading by Češljaš, Robert
Odsjek za Anglistiku 
 
Filozofski fakultet 
Sveučilište u Zagrebu 
 
 
 
 
DIPLOMSKI RAD 
Dystopian Framework of Sir Thomas More’s Utopia, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and 
George Orwell’s 1984: A Foucauldian Discourse Reading  
(Književno-kulturološki smjer: Engleska književnost i kultura) 
 
 
 
 
 
Kandidat: Robert Češljaš 
Mentor: dr. sc. Iva Polak 
Ak. godina: 2017./2018. 
Češljaš 1 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 2 
Communicating Utopia .............................................................................................................. 2 
Historical Context ...................................................................................................................... 5 
Utopia/Dystopia and the Rise of the Novel .............................................................................. 11 
Michel Foucault and Discourse ................................................................................................ 12 
Thomas More’s Utopia ............................................................................................................ 16 
George Orwell’s 1984 .............................................................................................................. 22 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World ......................................................................................... 29 
Shared Utopic/Dystopic Discourse in the Three Texts ............................................................ 34 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 40 
Works Cited .............................................................................................................................. 42 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 45 
Keywords ................................................................................................................................. 46 
Češljaš 2 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Literary scholars have generated extensive volumes of texts on the rise of the utopian writing, 
its definition as a genre, and the literary status of its evil twin, the dystopian novel. However, 
this paper offers a reading through somewhat narrower theoretical lens by arguing that 
utopian/dystopian writings can be viewed as a part of an evolving discourse, in a Foucauldian 
sense. However, rather than a discourse of disease, sexuality or criminology – topics that 
naturally come to mind in relation to Foucauldian discourse – the paper proposes that 
utopian/dystopian writings represent a discourse of the socially conceivable.  
After providing a historical framework for the utopian genre, with particular attention 
to Plato’s Republic as a point of origin of the utopian genre, the subsequent discussion shall 
provide a brief overview of the Foucauldian concept of discourse and its relevance to 
utopian/dystopian literary formats. This is followed by a discursive reading of Thomas More’s 
Utopia, George Orwell’s 19841, and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. These readings 
address the discursive function of each text as text – through Stanley Fish’s reader-response 
theory. On another level, these readings address the intrinsic functions of discourse within 
each text’s imagined, alternate social order, by focusing on discourses of social roles, 
education, and history/cultural memory. The final segment presents key observations that 
emerge when the texts are read together, rather than separate works, as part of an ongoing and 
evolving discourse. It is argued that, when understood as discourse in Foucauldian sense, the 
three utopian/dystopian writings mainly serve to reflect and reinforce status quo in political 
and social arrangements, rather than suggesting directions to social change. 
COMMUNICATING UTOPIA 
Within the opening pages of one of the great 20th-century dystopian novels, George Orwell’s 
1984, the book’s central protagonist, Winston Smith, embarks on a project that – while 
seemingly innocent to the average reader – is punishable by 25 years of hard labour in the 
setting of Orwell’s fictional, future London. The endeavour originates as a kind of an 
‘impulse buy’ in the planned economy of Orwell’s dystopic state: after seeing a blank book in 
the window of a shop in a shabby quarter of the city, Smith checks that no one is watching 
him, then rushes inside the store to purchase it. Orwell informs us that party members are not 
                                                          
1 The American edition was used for the thesis. The original British edition uses letters and was published as 
Nineteen Eighty-Four.   
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supposed to shop in free market stores like this one,2 but Smith finds the notebook irresistible. 
“It was a peculiarly beautiful book. Its smooth creamy paper, a little yellowed by age, was of 
a kind that had not been manufactured for at least forty years past” (Orwell 6). 
Smith begins his journal with hesitation, noting only the date. He observes that he 
cannot be entirely sure of the year. In current circumstances, it has become impossible to 
determine a date with accuracy. The word utopia, coined by Thomas More, famously denotes 
“nowhere” (as later played upon by Samuel Butler’s Erewhon, or loosely, “Nowhere” spelled 
backwards), and the idea of a utopia’s nowhereness is often felt to be a key defining feature of 
the genre (Sargent 154, 157). In Six Lines on the Island of Utopia, More plays with the term 
“utopia” – from the Greek word ou-topos, meaning nowhere – and “eutopia,” from Greek eu-
topos, meaning a good place (117, ftn 20). In this play on words, More insinuates that a true 
good place could not be found, since it is positioned nowhere. But if utopias are nowhere in 
space, Orwell hints that his gloomy dystopia is not entirely well-anchored in time. Which is to 
say, as famous as the date 1984 has become, is not important in itself. It is just the indicator of 
a possible, indeterminate future, which Orwell imagines in order to warn his readers in 19483 
of what may come to pass—a project that is reflected in Smith’s own: 
For whom, it suddenly occurred to him to wonder, was he writing this diary? For the 
future, for the unborn. His mind hovered for a moment round the doubtful date on the 
page […]. For the first time the magnitude of what he had undertaken came home to 
him. How could you communicate with the future? It was of its nature impossible. 
Either the future would resemble the present, in which case it would not listen to him, 
or it would be different from it, and his predicament would be meaningless. (Orwell 7) 
                                                          
2  This information comes without prior knowledge of what sort of party Orwell is referring to, or whether Smith 
is a member. However, it establishes a parallel between the dystopic world of 1984 and the Soviet state in 1948, 
when the novel was written. The importance of a party and rules for party members is one obvious reference, as 
is the crucial detail that free-market shops are considered politically tainted places. Moreover, the Soviet Union 
actually did have special hard-currency shops that carried premier goods. This might be surprising to outsiders 
with a distorted view of how planned economy functioned in the authoritarian Soviet state. But at the time that 
Orwell was writing, hard-currency shops were a vital way for the state to gather remaining stashes of western 
currencies from its citizens, in order to finance its rapid industrialization. Likewise, during times of famine, these 
stores sold food that allowed people to survive (Ivanova 244).  
Access to the stores would later be restricted to foreigners and party members who had recently returned from 
state-sanctioned work abroad (Ivanova 243). Yet sometimes even citizens out of favour with the regime could 
gain access to the stores. In 1969 a Soviet Russian political dissident, Andrei Amal’rik, wrote an essay so critical 
of the state, that it had to be smuggled out of the country for publication. Nevertheless, the regime allowed 
Amal’rik to collect a fee from the British journal that published it. The fee was delivered to him in the form of 
certificates for shopping in the hard-currency stores. The title of the essay that gave him this unusual access is 
“Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?” (Ivanova 243). 
3 The manuscript was finished in 1948. The first edition was published on 8th June 1949. 
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With this, Orwell establishes what is perhaps the central problem of writing utopias or 
dystopias: how to communicate the outlines of a radically different social world, located in a 
fictional geography or fictional future, so that this other, nowhere place feels appealing and 
important to read? How to write about it so that it conveys a convincing message about what 
is possible to accomplish in a society or what is important to avoid? In 1984, Smith creates a 
textual conundrum to the reader in the future, while Orwell writes a pseudo-prophecy to the 
reader in the present. 
This does not imply that every utopian or dystopian writing calls for the same political 
urgency as Orwell’s 1984, or pretends to represent a guide to building a better society or 
avoiding disaster. Indeed, it is often emphasised that More’s foundational book, Utopia, is 
thoroughly playful and often humorous, creating an uncertainty for any interpretation of its 
message (Sargent 158; Rodríguez García 84). Yet the fact remains that lively discussion and 
debate of More’s Utopia continues more than 500 years after it was written,4 precisely 
because readers and critics seek to stake their claims on the text’s interpretation. Additionally, 
utopian/dystopian writing has gained unprecedented currency in the 21st century due its socio-
political implications, whether we are speaking of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, 
Orwell’s 1984 or Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale. 
Writers of utopias and dystopias instil fictional societies with realness and meaning for 
audiences rooted in their own existing social worlds. They claim the authority needed to 
convince readers to pay attention to what these alternate worlds have to say about the real 
world. The means at their disposal, this paper proposes, is discourse. 
Discourse is invoked here in a Foucauldian sense. By discourse, Foucault indicates 
systems of statements that construct and enact knowledge about human societies, with each 
statement making a claim concerning what is desirable, knowable, or real – for instance, 
statements about psychology and mental illness, medicine and disease, crime and 
criminology, or even geography (“Questions on Geography” 63). There is no one point of 
origin for a discourse, no definitive author or definitive catalogue of it. Instead, a discourse is 
achieved through the “regular dispersion” of statements associated with it, each statement 
making a claim about what is desirable, knowable, or true (“Questions on Geography” 63). 
However, as Paul Bové notes, “since the ‘truths’ of these discourses are relative to the 
disciplinary structures, the logical framework in which they are institutionalized, they can 
have no claim upon us except that derived from the authority and legitimacy, the power, 
                                                          
4 As Davis notes, the work has “enjoy[ed] worldwide popularity, being translated into numerous vernaculars, and 
scarcely ever out of print in the 500 years since its first publication in 1516,” (28). 
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granted to or acquired by the institutionalized discourses in question” (54). It follows that, 
each time an individual repeats a statement related to a discourse, the individual enacts, 
affirms, and extends the authority and power of that discourse.  
It has become popular to suggest that knowledge is power – by which is usually meant 
that the more knowledge one has, the more power one has as well. But for Foucault, 
knowledge does not relay power; it is power. In this relation, “knowledge and power are 
integrated with one another,” and the correlation will never cease to exist (“Prison Talk” 52). 
The dialectic of power is deeply entrenched in the social body and its function is to 
“permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot 
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse” (“Two Lectures” 93). The 
manifested discourse is essentially an instantiation of power that holds individuals tied to 
specific systems of ideas concerning what is desirable, knowable, or true.  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Although More is famously credited with coining the term utopia (Sargent 154; Vieira 3) the 
first work considered to embody the utopian genre predates More’s Utopia by nearly a 
millennium. It is Plato’s Republic, in which Plato lays out the program of a polity 
administered according to the demands of justice as Plato understands that term (Griswold 
part 3.1; Vieira 8). As Margaret Atwood notes in an essay on the writing of The Handmaid’s 
Tale, “Utopia is an extreme example of the impulse to order; it’s the word should run 
rampant” (95). Atwood’s observation fits Plato’s Republic well, for unlike More’s seminal 
work, Plato proceeds with no ambivalence or ambiguity and refrains from humor.  
Central to Plato’s certainty concerning how the ideal polity is to be achieved is the 
concept of rhetoric. When Socrates proposes in Book II of The Republic, “[L]et’s make a city 
in speech from the beginning,” he appears to be conveying more than the obvious fact that his 
city of perfect justice is being imagined through Socratic dialog (in this case with Glaucon 
and Andeimantus, 46). He is indicating that a city of perfect justice – the justice-driven nature 
of any polity or even of an individual – must be achieved, first and foremost, through the 
correct sort of speech. 
The means to this end is laid out in Book II, where Plato describes the type of 
education he believes would be vital in shaping the mentality of the philosopher-guardians 
charged with overseeing, protecting, and propagating justice in his perfect polity. Socrates 
begins by noting: 
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“Don't you know that the beginning is the most important part of every work and that 
this is especially so with anything young and tender [as a young child to be educated]? 
For at that stage it's most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose 
stamp anyone wishes to give to it.” 
“Quite so.”  
“Then shall we so easily let the children hear just any tales fashioned by just anyone 
and take into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those we'll suppose 
they must have when they are grown up?”  
“In no event will we permit it.” (54-55) 
As a result, Socrates concludes, the fundamental step to be taken when educating the 
guardians of the perfect state is to supervise those who make the tales that are told to children 
and which serve to form children’s supple senses of right and wrong (55). As the key figures 
who tell childhood stories, mothers and caregivers must be ordered “to tell the approved tales 
to their children and to shape their souls with tales more than their bodies with hands” (55). 
Indeed, most of the tales that currently are told to children, Socrates concludes, must be 
thrown out, because they do not shape children’s souls with a sufficient sense of justice. Even 
Homer is subject to this critique, for Plato believes that at the heart of literary tragedy is an 
idea that can corrupt young souls – the idea that good people sometimes suffer greatly, while 
evil individuals sometimes flourish (Griswold part 3.1). Indeed, according to Socrates: 
poet mustn't be allowed to say that those who pay the penalty are wretched and that 
the one who did it was a god. […] he should say that the bad men were wretched 
because they needed punishment and that in paying the penalty they were benefited 
by the god […] (Plato 58) 
In order to nurture the justice-seeking instinct, Plato suggests that children must be exposed 
only to discourse of reaffirming the central idea that the cosmos reflects divine justice, 
supporting goodness and punishing wickedness (Griswold 3.1). Thus, it seems fair to suggest 
that, at the inception of the literature of utopia, the role of discourse was already fundamental. 
Plato does not shy away from fabrications – a concept of “noble lie” – for the sake of public 
interests (90). The greater good is allowed to take precedence (a manoeuvre often employed 
by fictional and real totalitarian systems alike). 
It is equally important to note that the idea of failed utopia, if not dystopia in its 
modern conception, appears to have been born simultaneously. It may be considered as 
utopia’s twin – in fact, its slightly older twin. Plato’s Republic dates to c. 370-360 BC (Vieira 
8). If Plato can be considered the first great utopian thinker, Sargent suggests that 
Aristophanes is the first great writer of the failed utopia. His Ecclesiazusae, or “Women in 
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Parliament dates to 393 BC” (Sargent 156).5 Ecclesiazusae tells how a group of assembly-
women seek to form a communistic ideal state by taking over Parliament. “Their legislation 
fails not because it is bad but because the human race is not capable of the required altruism,” 
a point made again through Aristophanes’ later work, Platus (388 BCE). In Platus the blind 
god of wealth suddenly recovers the power of sight, which prompts him to redistribute wealth 
to those with merit. However, greedy human beings quickly intervene to unravel this new and 
more just scheme, returning wealth to those who are undeserving (Sargent 156). Platus is a 
type of tale that Plato would consider dangerous to a child’s moral development. 
More’s 16th-century Utopia bears the thematic marks of Plato’s work. It emerged in a 
post-Medieval Europe whose intellectual elites looked to classical antiquity for inspiration, 
even as they forged a new humanism for Western Europe (Vieira; Rodríguez García). Central 
to the new intellectual movement was the conviction that humans could apply reason and 
science in order to create “not […] a state of human perfection (which would be impossible 
within a Christian worldview, as the idea of the Fall still persisted), but at least an ability to 
arrange society differently in order to ensure peace” (Vieira 4). As discussed further below, 
the discovery of the New World additionally served to fuel new ideas of the social order. More 
himself, according to Vieira, took inspiration from the diaries and letters of Columbus and 
Vespucci and “used the emerging awareness of otherness to legitimize the invention of other 
spaces, with other people and different forms of social organization” (4). 
A great deal of scholarly attention is given to considering the boundaries of utopia as a 
genre after More. Sargent complains that “utopia and utopianism are often conflated,” leading 
to an overinclusive approach to the genre – including not only described travels to an 
imagined place with radically different, beneficial social arrangements, but “descriptions of 
ideal cities and what might be called architectural utopias, […] paintings like the various 
works entitled ‘Peaceable Kingdom’ by Edward Hicks;” and so on (154). Peter Fitting 
attempts to clarify the terminological confusion by defining utopia as “a non-existent society 
described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space,” while dystopia is 
defined as “a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in 
time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous read to view as considerably 
worse than the society in which that reader lived” (126). Other artistic and intellectual 
endeavors fall under the category of “utopianism,” which encompasses utopian studies 
examining the philosophical “social dreaming” (Fitting 126). 
                                                          
5 According to Sargent (154), the first usages of the term ‘dystopia’ appear in the mid to late 1700s (154), though 
Vieira attributes John Stewart Mill with the first use of the term in 1868 (16). 
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However, for the purpose of this paper it is enough to note that, after More, utopian 
writing thrived across much of Europe. It found particularly fertile soil in Britain, where 
Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis was published in 1627; Francis Godwin’s The Man in the 
Moone, or, a Discourse of Voyage Thither, in 1638; and Gabriel Plattes’ A Description of the 
Famous Kingdome of Macaria, in 1641 (Pohl, 51).  
The Enlightenment marked a strengthening of the genre across Europe, as well as a 
noticeable shift away from utopian imaginings that unavoidably dealt with the Christian 
problematic of how inherently sinful human beings could build an ideal society. It moved 
toward a much more open optimism, in which the central issue was that science and 
rationality would drive the perfection of social arrangements (Vieira 9). In this, utopian 
thinkers and writers were not only inspired by technological progress, but by the late 18th-
century revolutions in the American colonies and in France (Pohl 81). Undeniably, the 
emphasis on progress was such that, according to Pohl, the euchronia,6 or a vision of an ideal 
society set in a future time, came largely to succeed utopia in literature. This reflects a context 
in which the “belief that under the right conditions improvement was not only possible, but 
also natural, invited readers to assume that progress was as self-evident as the laws of nature 
that promised democracy, equality and happiness in the Declaration of Independence” (Pohl 
82).  
The Enlightenment’s faith in progress also served to foster socialist utopian thinking 
and literature. Sargent (154) might disagree with such a wide approach to the genre, but both 
Vieira (11) and Pohl (82) include socialist utopian writers. For Vieira, the prime characteristic 
of this branch of utopian writing and thought is the notion that “it is up to man to conceive 
plans for the reconstruction of society and to put them into practice” (11, emphasis added). 
Indeed, Welsh socialist Robert Owen not only published his visions of a new and more 
perfect society, but actively attempted to enact one by founding socialist communities (one in 
Scotland and one in the United states) that “set the basis for the creation of what he called ‘a 
new moral world,’ inhabited by those who would have adhered to a new religion, which 
would have given them the needed ethical support—the religion of humanity” (Vieira 12).  
Vieira further views the political writing of Marx and Engels as crucial to the 
development of the utopian literary genre. However, as Vieira argues, when Marx and Engels 
applied the term ‘utopian’ to the thought and writings of certain socialist thinkers, they did so 
                                                          
6 For the purpose of this paper, dyschronia is treated as synonymous with dystopia, since both 1984 and Brave 
New World use the future as the site for their dystopic imaginings. In fact, it is difficult to name a dystopia that 
does not use chronology to situate its imagined society. Dystopias, as Atwood writes, “are dark shadows cast by 
the present into the future” (94).   
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as an insult and indicating the lack of systematic and scientific analysis of society, conflict, 
and social change. In other words, they dismissed such work as wishful thinking (12). Yet, if 
Marx and Engels hoped to establish the notion of political utopianism as insufficiently 
scientific: 
Marxism not only did not provoke the death of utopian thought, but instead forced its 
transformation, a situation that was crucial to its success. As Karl Mannheim pointed 
out in Ideology and Utopia (1929), this transformation was denoted in the way the 
future came to be perceived […]. (Vieira 13-14) 
Vieira seems to be suggesting that the transformation she is describing is the equating 
of time with progress, both scientific and social. Once that equation is made, the concept of 
ideal society becomes both achievable and inevitable. Marxism thus emerges as the 
embodiment of Enlightenment thought. It is removing the last fragments of the Christian 
problematics – i.e., how can the perfect society be achieved by inherently flawed and sinful 
humans? – and proposing that humans can and will realize their perfect potential once the 
correct social relations are in place.  
In contrast to Vieira, I would argue that the crucial shift Marxism seems to have 
enabled in utopian writing was not as much toward the idea of inevitable social perfection, 
but away from the idea that human nature is the stumbling block in the achievement of a 
better social order. Instead of humans, their flawed or sinful natures as the reason that utopias 
remain continuously nowhere and nowhen in reality, social systems are identified as the 
problem. In this regard, Marxist thought contributes to a broader intellectual trend, and toward 
the systematic study of societies and social problems, as shown by the 19th century rise of 
sociology as a developed and scientifically justified system. The greater emphasis on 
sociological thinking occurred within literature as well. That is reflected by the emergence of 
fictional works dealing with major social structures and their effects on human freedoms and 
its experience – from Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South (1855), which tackled issues of 
class and region in England; to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), which 
cast issues of racial oppression in the U.S.; to Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace (1869) which, 
among other things also grappled with the question of how to improve the lot of Russian 
peasants. None of these works is a utopian or dystopian writing. As a group, however, they 
reflect a broad intellectual shift toward acknowledgement of the ways that social systems 
shape human experience and either facilitate or limit human freedoms.  
It is also doubtful that the Marxist view of social perfection as historically inevitable 
significantly shaped the course of utopian writing, given that few utopian writings after Plato 
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depict societies that are uniformly positive or perfect (Atwood 94; Vieira 13). Atwood 
remarks in this regard that, while there do exist examples of “extreme utopias,” in which all 
inhabitants share the same concept of the good, as well as “extreme dystopias,” which are 
marked by repressive and absolute control over their people,7 “[i]n-between is where most 
Utopias-Dystopias, as well as most human societies fall” (94-95). This degree of non-
absoluteness in utopian writings suggests that the Marxist idea of historical inevitability of 
social perfection did not come to permeate the genre. 
Moreover, it was precisely around the time that Marxist ideas were taking root that 
dystopian visions began to emerge with clarity, a point that Vieira herself makes: “When the 
idea of euchronia came to be systematically promoted (i.e. when utopian thought turned 
towards the future), it was inevitably accompanied by the imagination of darker times” (16). 
Here, Vieira’s suggests that the Marxist insistence on history/time as the central point of 
human development laid the foundation for the emergence of dystopian writing. However, it 
seems equally plausible that dystopic writings were enabled by a wider emergence of 
systematic approaches in the field of social studies. This possibility is further supported by the 
fact that dystopian writings – as opposed to the early failed utopias – almost inevitably 
highlight flawed social systems, but by no means uniformly highlight themes of communism. 
The history of major periods in utopian writing makes one thing clear: despite their 
promoted nowhereness and nowheness, utopian works are, ultimately, deeply reflective of 
major social and intellectual undercurrents within the places and times they were written. 
Atwood makes a strong related point concerning her own dystopic novel, The Handmaid’s 
Tale, when she refuses to label it as science fiction. According to her view, science fiction 
involves writing about things that are not possible in the present, whereas in The Handmaid’s 
Tale, “[n]othing inconceivable takes place, and the projected trends on which my future 
society is based are already in motion” (92). 
Yet, to say that utopian works merely reflect social context is to exclude their power to 
help construct the very same context to begin with, or to help extend it. Hence, the analysis 
proposed here focuses on such works as a discourse which reevaluates their importance, 
casting them not as merely imaginative reflections of contemporary social currents, but as 
active interventions into evolving systems of knowledge. The idea that utopian writings 
function as discourse is supported by the fact that many of the most enduring utopian works 
                                                          
7 It is symptomatic of both the extreme utopia and the extreme dystopia that “neither contains any lawyers” 
(Atwood 4). The extreme utopia renders lawyers redundant by producing perfect unity among its members, 
while the extreme dystopia renders lawyers redundant by exerting total and tyrannical social control.   
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have been produced by leading intellectuals of their times, men and women with established 
political and social involvement – including figures such as Thomas More, George Orwell, 
and Aldous Huxley, the authors whose works are considered here.  
UTOPIA/DYSTOPIA AND THE RISE OF THE NOVEL 
It seems impossible to discuss works as diverse as Plato’s Republic, More’s Utopia, and 
Orwell’s 1984, without paying attention to their respective narrative forms. Although Plato’s 
Republic assumes the form of dialog, it must be viewed as a clear example of a political 
treatise. Here the word political should be understood the same way it was used and 
understood by the Roman statesman Cicero, who employed the Greek word for political when 
describing his own Republic as a political treatise. In this context, the word “refers not 
primarily to practical politics, but to a branch of philosophy, the theory of the polis or city-
state; this was regarded as a part of the larger study of ‘ethics,’ the theory of human character 
and behaviour” (Powell and Rudd xi). It systematically lays out Plato’s ideas concerning the 
building of the ideal state, without allowing narrative elements such as plot or character to 
interfere with the methodical report of the author’s ideas. This is a form open to a treatment as 
discourse (defined here as systems of statements that construct and enact knowledge about 
human societies, with each statement making a claim concerning what is desirable, knowable, 
or real), since Plato’s treatise seeks directly to contribute to public opinion and debate. 
More’s Utopia takes a markedly different narrative approach than the Republic, 
presenting itself as an example of the travel writing genre8. The genre enjoyed great success 
in early modern Europe, with popularity fuelled by nonfiction reports of voyages to the so-
called New World and to locations like Tahiti, Australia, Patagonia, and Hawaii. Travel 
accounts of real explorations introduced the radical other to Europe9 and helped open 
European perception to the possibility of alternate social orders (Trouillot 14-18; Vieira 3-4). 
Yet, fictional travel accounts tended to merge with nonfiction ones in the public imagination. 
An intriguing number of writers of utopian travel narratives also produced early 
anthropological (nonfiction) writings. In this light, it appears possible (or perhaps mandatory) 
to treat utopian travel accounts as contributions to discourses concerning the prospect and 
appeal of alternative social arrangements. 
                                                          
8 The 1743 edition published in Scotland was subtitled “A Philosophical Romance” (Davis 30). 
9 Although, the Muslim Arab provided the original other against which European identity solidified (Trouillot 
20-21). 
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But the rise of the modern novel represents the most radical shift in narrative 
approaches to utopia. In both the political treatise and the travel account, narrative elements 
are secondary to didactic content. This is not possible within a fully developed novel, for 
several reasons. First, the modern novel presents itself explicitly as fiction; second, and 
somewhat contrary, it seeks to create a sense of realness for the reader, primarily through 
presentation of detail, including descriptions of times, places, events, and sensory experiences 
that make the world of the novel feel real (Watt 32). Third, and most importantly, the modern 
novel probes into the inner lives and psychology of complex characters, so that the reader 
comes to identify with these characters and share their feelings about the stories’ events (Watt 
201). In a fully realized modern novel, the story unfolds according to the internal logics of a 
world and a series of events presented as real despite their fictive status. Didactic content 
must assume a secondary role to these outlines. 
At first glance, it might seem difficult to treat novels as discourse in a Foucauldian 
sense. After all, Foucauldian discourse is identified with groups of statements emanating from 
expert professions and institutions such as medicine (“The History of Sexuality” 183-193) and 
penology/criminology (“Prison Talk” 37-54). These statements, however, are fundamental in 
the general framework for truth-production, as truth is: 
a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And 
it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its “general 
politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true. (“Truth and Power” 131) 
Yet, as it will be discussed anon, Foucault does not limit the concept of discourse to the 
statements of experts. Novels often make direct interventions into existing social discourses, 
even if they are not presented as such. So, the key thesis here is to view utopian/dystopian 
texts as discourses that articulate with power, not by representing themselves as knowledge, 
per se, but by plotting the boundaries of what might be known. These are discourses of the 
socially conceivable. 
MICHEL FOUCAULT AND DISCOURSE 
Michel Foucault was both a philosopher and an historian greatly influenced by the 
history of science, and his major works include continuous historical investigations of 
evolving bodies of Western expertise on mental illness, sexuality, and crime/prisoner life 
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(Gutting, n. p.). Each of these made signal contributions to their respective fields. However, it 
was Foucault’s approach to discourse that established him as a major intellectual force across 
the disciplines. And it was Foucault’s understanding of power10 that gave his concept of 
discourse “a newly powerful critical function” (Bové 53). 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power is extensively grounded in Continental 
philosophy (see Gutting), but Foucault himself attributed the crucial shift in his understanding 
of power to his research of the history of prisons and techniques of prisoner control (“History 
of Sexuality” 183-184). Jeremy Bentham’s “panopticon” is placed centrally in this new 
conceptualization, due to its reliance on observation as a technique of control, which is 
particularly effective and extensive in its effects because it raises a sense of being watched 
that prisoners themselves internalize (Gutting n. p.). For Foucault, the panopticon, along with 
numerous other techniques for controlling dangerous populations that emerged in late 18th-
century and early 19th-century Western Europe, signalled a broader transformation in the 
exercise of power. While power had once been firmly centralized, exercised from the top 
down, new mechanisms of coordination and control reconstituted power as a field 
“coextensive with the social body” itself, so that “power is ‘always already there’ […] one is 
never ‘outside’ it, [and] there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system to gambol 
in” (“Power and Strategies” 141-142, emphasis in the original). Returning to the rise of 
surveillance as a mechanism of control, for instance, we might reference the ever-increasing 
number of contemporary contexts in which individuals feel watched – whether in stores 
(regardless of whether a store actually has its cameras switched on); or on London streets, due 
to a pervasive regime of CCTV; or even in their own living rooms, given that ‘smart TVs’ 
have been known to transmit the content of private conversations, without their owners’ 
knowledge or consent (McGoogan n. p.). 
Power, in this sense, courses through the social body. It is not primarily being wielded 
by a central authority via the threat of legal sanctions or physical violence, but: 
[p]ower must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which 
only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; 
                                                          
10 Foucault suggests his own, characteristic approach to power did not emerge until after his writings on madness 
and mental illness in the early 1960s (“History of Sexuality” 183-184). 
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they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the 
vehicles of power, not its points of application. (“Two Lectures” 98) 
 
 For that reason, Foucault speaks of this power as capillary, referring to the thinnest 
vessels that carry blood throughout the body and to locations furthest from the heart.11 
Capillary power represents “the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, 
touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives” (“Prison Talk” 39). In modernity, power is exercised “within 
the social body, rather than from above it” (“Prison Talk” 39, emphasis in the original).  
This is not to suggest that power in the modern era becomes formless, or that it is no 
longer arranged according to the schemes that benefit the state or dominant classes. Power can 
no longer be thought of as “a binary structure with ‘dominators’ on one side and ‘dominated’ 
on the other” (“Strategies and Power” 142). Instead, an array of techniques and mechanisms, 
originating from various centres of power – e.g., the state, professional bodies, or institutions 
that control financial transactions – serve to shape and connect an ever-expanding network of 
social relations through which power is enacted, extended, and enhanced. 
Foucauldian discourse is generally understood as a series of statements issued from 
institutions and professional bodies; describing specific domains of social life (e.g., madness, 
sexuality, prisons); and which collectively endorse specific ideas concerning what is 
desirable, knowable, or true in social life. Discourses are systems of topics on various 
subjects, originating from agents who produce what is claimed to be the best, most accurate 
knowledge of a subject. According to Foucault, the medical profession is the most significant 
and prolific producer of discourse in the modern era, since “[i]t was in the name of medicine 
both that people came to inspect the layout of houses, and equally, that they classified 
individuals as insane, criminal, or sick” (“Body/Power” 62). But any number of fields could 
be mentioned in this regard, from education, criminology, to social work and sociology, 
management studies, ethics, etc. In representing itself as knowledge, discourse merely 
disguises the fact that it is also a mechanism of power, one that organizes our very sense of 
what is desirable, knowable, or true, in the interest of the state and other stakeholders.  
It is a defining feature of a Foucauldian discourse that it cannot be fully catalogued or 
recognised (“Prison Talk” 38). Although, central to Foucault’s method is the assumption that 
researchers can identify seeds of new knowledge around which discourses group and 
                                                          
11 Also, Foucault describes this new form of power as ‘synaptic,’ referring to neural pathways in human bodies 
(“Prison Talk” 39). 
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multiply, and which play a special role in nurturing the power arrangements of a particular 
place and time. In this sense, the Foucauldian concept of discourse is far removed from the 
term so often used in literary studies, in connection with the New Criticism. For the New 
Critics, “discourses” contain specific, distinct rhetorical forms with “established identities,” 
each of which “establishe[s] the limits of a particular genre” (Bové 50). When used in this 
narrow sense, discourse represents itself as a kind of transhistorical ‘pure knowledge’ 
generated by truth-seeking experts. What does and does not belong within a given literary 
discourse is exclusively the domain of experts. Non-experts have no role in creating or 
extending it. 
In contrast, the opportunities to participate in discourse, understood in Foucauldian 
sense, are as all-embracing and omnipresent as power itself. This is because discourses offer 
what Bové calls “the power of positive production,” by which he means: “a kind of power that 
generates certain kinds of questions, placed within systems that legitimate, support, and 
answer those questions,” producing individuals “as agents capable of acting within them” 
(54). We might, for instance, consider how discourses of democracy and rights play out in 
everyday talk. Often, we hear people make claims such as, “in this country I have the right to 
do X,” or “people who do not value this country should move out.” Each such reference 
reinforces a sense of what democracy is (the desirable, knowable, or true), while 
strengthening the political justification for the form of regime under which the speaker lives. 
The reference claims the truth, even when the speaker’s references to specific rights are 
illogical or technically incorrect. Simultaneously, such statements generate the experience of 
power and knowledge for the speaker, as “[t]he exercise of power itself creates and causes 
[…] new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information” (“Prison Talk” 
51). The procedure leads to the unavoidable deconstruction of the scientifically established 
spheres of knowledge, as truth converts to “a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” emanating from the whole 
social body (“Prison Talk” 133). Ultimately, discourses come to shape what individuals hold 
to be, and actively confirm as being, “self-evident” or “commonsensical” (Bové 54). In 
Foucauldian view, what passes as self-evident or commonsensical is merely discourse that has 
achieved “the privilege of unnoticed power” (Bové 54). 
Utopian/dystopian writings do not make straightforward claims to knowledge. As 
mentioned earlier, these texts almost uniformly reject their claim on the real. Plato’s work is 
detached by suggesting that the ideal republic can only exist in rhetoric. More announces 
Utopia as a “nowhere” island, immersed in innuendo and textual artfulness. The dystopias of 
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Orwell and Huxley are set in the future, and thus out of the realm of actually knowable. Yet 
each of these disclaimers must be viewed with a grain of salt, because it is not the domain of 
such works to produce the same kind of knowledge as discourses emanating from fields such 
as medicine, psychiatry, criminology or social work. Utopian/dystopian texts are discourses of 
the socially conceivable, which articulate with power by pushing out the boundaries of the 
knowable. 
Considering utopian/dystopian writings as discourse shapes the method taken to their 
analysis. A number of scholars of utopian writing seem preoccupied with defining the genre 
and determining what does or does not ‘count’ as a utopia, dystopia, euchronia, etc. (see, e.g., 
Sargent; Vieira). When treating texts as discourse in the Foucauldian sense, though, it makes 
little sense to focus on how well a work does or does not conform to an ideal genre. Instead, 
focus shifts to how the texts themselves operate to produce certain kinds of knowledge, or 
push out the boundaries of the conceivable, as in the case of utopian/dystopian texts. 
THOMAS MORE’S UTOPIA 
As noted above, More’s Utopia is modelled on the early travel writing. This would become a 
popular subgenre in its own right, and utopian travel stories established a generally consistent 
narrative. These narratives featured a European individual who journeys to an unknown land 
(often one that is supposedly situated in newly explored territories) and by happy chance finds 
a native guide who, as the journey proceeds, explains native social practices and customs (e.g. 
religion, love/sex, economy). The traveller then returns home to retell the wonders of what he 
has learned concerning other, alternate ways of life (Vieira 6). The 18th-century Robinsonades 
and Gulliverianas, the most popular forms of imaginary voyages, employed this structure as 
the foundation for their narrative. Although such accounts could become quite farfetched, 
they shared and maintained a didactic core along with nonfiction travel accounts, representing 
an emerging European intellectual project “that tied order to the quest of universal truths, a 
quest that gave savagery and utopia their relevance” (Trouillot 21). 
Intriguingly, the line between fictional utopian travel writing and nonfictional travel 
accounts became so blurred in this period that, “[o]utside of a restricted group of overzealous 
scholars and administrators, it mattered little to the larger European audience whether such 
works were fictitious or not” (Trouillot 15). Indeed, a number of notable intellectuals moved 
back and forth between fictional and nonfictional modes of writing on exotic others:  
Voltaire, who read voraciously the travel descriptions of his time, gave us Candide 
and Zadig. But he also used paraethnographic descriptions to participate in 
Češljaš 17 
 
anthropological debates of his time […]. Denis Diderot, who may have read more 
travel accounts than anyone then alive, and who turned many of them into 
paraethnographic descriptions for the Encyclopédie, wrote two utopias true to form. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, whom Claude Lévi-Strauss called “the father of ethnology,” 
sought the most orderly link between the “state of nature” first described by Martire 
d’Anghiera and the “ideal commonwealth” envisioned by More and his followers. He 
thus unwittingly formalized the myth of the “noble savage” […] (Trouillot 16) 
In Utopia, however, More is not the narrator who travels to the fantasy island of 
Utopia, on which the book is focused. Instead, in the first section of the book, More recounts 
an ambassadorial trip to Holland, during which he meets with a friend, Peter Giles. Giles 
introduces him to Raphael Hythloday, a Portuguese man who supposedly encountered Utopia 
on his voyages with Amerigo Vespucci – thus establishing the factual-fictional fusion of 
utopian travel accounts. Yet the framing of the narrative viewpoint turns out to be doubly 
complex, since Peter Giles was a real, historical individual and More’s friend, while 
Hythloday is a fictional character. Giles was well-known to the humanist intellectual circles 
emerging in early modern Europe, so his presence in the narrative serves to reinforce the 
humanist authenticity and seriousness of the text. Yet the introduction of Raphael Hythloday 
is an interruption that communicates something along the lines of an intellectual disclaimer. 
Contemporary readers would recognize the dual references of the character’s name: Raphael, 
a reference to the archangel Raphael, who was a healer and the patron saint of sailors, and 
Hythloday, which “suggested to humanist grammarians an idle talker, a dealer in nonsense or 
an expert in trifles” (Davis 29). Furthermore, as Davis points out, once the name of his 
Portuguese conversationalist is revealed as a literary device loaded with biblical and classical 
references, More’s own name becomes susceptible to examination as well. More’s real name 
carries as many significant references as the name of his fictional character does, with 
Thomas referring to the doubter among Christ’s apostles, and More meaning (through its 
Latin form) “the fool” (Davis 29).12 Hence: 
[…] learned readers were immediately being asked to decide whether to attach 
credibility to an account by the most disinterested and experienced of travelers, a 
healer and divine messenger, but also perhaps a purveyor of nonsense, or to the 
reaction of a sceptic who might also be a fool (Davis 29) 
 In the first section of the book, More and Hythloday converse on a number of political 
matters and the picture becomes yet more complex. On the one hand, Hythloday is presented 
                                                          
12 At the time, the latter was “a particularly relevant reference, given the publication of Moriae Encomium, 
Praise of Folly, by Erasmus in 1511” (Davis, 29). 
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as a man of great integrity, indicated by the fact that, although Giles urges Hythloday to enter 
king’s service and thus make his mark on political affairs, Hythloday emphatically rejects the 
idea. He clarifies he would be tainted by engagement in politics, and that kings and princes 
generally seek flattery from their companions, not sage advice (More 8-10). Through this 
response, Hythloday proves himself to be an intellectual heir of Plato, whom he later cites 
directly on that point (More 33-48).  
Hythloday proposes that “there is no room for philosophy in the courts of princes,” 
More-the-narrator disagrees, suggesting that abstract philosophy is of little use to rulers, but 
that a practical and tactful philosopher would know how to make useful interjections at the 
right moment (More 47). When Hythloday states his criticism of private property, More 
counters with the advantages of private ownership. At moments such as this, More-the-
narrator appears moderate and rational, while Hythloday comes across as too impassioned to 
be taken completely seriously. 
A good deal of academic discussion of Utopia revolves around the issue of whether 
More-the-author meant to endorse the radical ideas that Hythloday introduces (see Davis). 
When the text is treated as discourse, the more interesting question is how the text operates, 
regardless of authorial intent. In this respect, the subtle othering of Hythloday makes it 
possible for the text to introduce potentially shocking ideas without acquiring the tone of a 
political manifesto. In a sense, this distancing is an extension of the nowhereness concept: the 
text moves readers from the real world of More, with his political concerns and intellectual 
activities, to the passionate worldview of Hythloday, a fictional but realistic character. At the 
same time, the reader is thrust into the fantasy world of Utopia itself, regarding which we 
have only Hythloday’s reports. This gradual immersion in the unreal is mirrored by the 
covertly systematic way the text unfolds. Although scholars routinely refer to the first and 
second sections of the book, in reality there is no sharp division. In the first few pages, we 
accompany More to Holland where he meets Giles, who introduces him to Hythloday. 
Hythloday gradually speaks more and more of Utopia, encouraging More to suggest they 
retire to dinner, so that Hythloday can tell them about Utopia in greater detail. Thus, over 
dinner, Hythloday begins systematically relating his knowledge of Utopia, but this unfolds as 
a natural extension of earlier conversations and does not disrupt from the first section of the 
book. Then, suddenly, a new chapter heading appears, “Of Their Towns, Particularly of 
Amaurot” (60). From there the book reads as a series of brief proto-anthropological reports on 
various aspects of Utopia. More-the-narrator only briefly reappears at the end of these reports, 
noting to the reader that, since Hythloday seemed very tired, he delayed any sort of engaged 
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discussion of Utopia to another time (175). The only insight the reader is provided into More-
the-narrator’s assessment of Utopia is usually ambivalent. He declares that he finds several 
aspects of Utopian society “very absurd”, although he admits “there are many things in the 
commonwealth of Utopia that I rather wish, than hope, to see followed in our governments” 
(175-176). 
Because the rest of the book unfolds as a series of reports by Hythloday, readers do 
not ever access the voices or documents of Utopians or their discourses. In this respect, the 
treatment markedly differs from Orwell’s and Huxley’s novelistic accounts. Yet Hythloday 
provides plenty of details concerning Utopian social roles and education – neither of which 
can be regarded without treating the principal fact of Utopian society: its denial of private 
property.13  
The rejection of private property is evident in the very way Utopians shape their social 
space, a point that articulates with the 20th-century work of Henri Lefebvre, who argued that 
social systems are embodied and lived through the spaces they create. The town Amaurot (and 
Hythloday notes that all Utopian towns are similar in their use of space) is laid out so that 
every house has a front door to the street and a back door to a garden. None of the houses are 
locked, because without a private property system there is no theft (although this idea is 
contradicted by Hythloday’s account of the treatment of thieves, discussed immediately 
below). Moreover, every ten years, families switch houses by drawing lots, suggesting that 
even in More’s time location was an essential element in the value of a property. Thus, 
Utopian custom demanded this value be spread as equally as possible among its citizens (62). 
While the text imagines a society that functions without the institution of private 
property, it does not imagine a regime of complete equality in social roles. This is 
demonstrated most clearly by the fact that Utopian law allows holding slaves and indentured 
servants. Convicted thieves, for instance, are sentenced to serve as public workers, and they 
wear distinct clothes and haircuts to mark their servitude, although they can redeem 
themselves and regain their freedom through hard work (25-28). However, any potential 
instability presented by this servitude and the resulting social inequality, is explained: 
The only danger to be feared from them is their conspiring against the government; 
but those of one division and neighbourhood can do nothing to any purpose unless a 
general conspiracy were laid amongst all the slaves of the several jurisdictions, which 
cannot be done, since they cannot meet or talk together (28) 
                                                          
13 This fact has made More a cornerstone of Communist thinkers. Karl Kautsky called Utopia “the foregleam of 
Modern Socialism,” and Vladimir Lenin made sure More was included in a public monument portraying western 
thinkers admired by the new Soviet state (Papke 29).  
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Slaves are also taken in war, though the children of slaves taken on the battlefield are not 
considered slaves (115). Most notably, adulterers, like thieves, are sentenced to serve in the 
public works. Innocent spouses who wish to continue the marriage are condemned to follow 
them into this servitude (123).  
Two tendencies emerge in these accounts of slavery and indentured servitude that run 
throughout the book. First, More (as the author) cannot seem to grasp a society without 
robbery and war, which are felt to be inevitable – even if it is a fantastic and isolated one. 
Once the book is treated as discourse, this becomes one of its most fascinating aspects: it 
exposes the limits to the socially conceivable. In addition, the role of gender in the 
imaginative rendering of Utopia’s equality also lays bare crucial limits to the conceivable. 
 Clothing is used to highlight the equality of free people, as well as their rejection of 
wealth as an element of status. So, all Utopians dress plainly, “without any other distinction 
except what is necessary to distinguish the two sexes and the married and unmarried” (67). 
The text creatively presents an episode to emphasise how profoundly deep-rooted the 
plainness of self-presentation is in Utopian life. According to Hythloday, nearby island 
nations sometimes send ambassadors to Utopia and representatives from nations familiar with 
Utopian custom arrive plainly dressed. However, the Anemolians were insufficient acquainted 
with Utopian life and were, as Hythloday puts it, a “vainglorious rather than a wise people” 
(90). So, when three representatives of the Anemolians, one of Utopia’s neighbouring nations, 
made a formal visit to Utopia, they came dressed in their finest clothes and decorated with 
gold and gems, reasoning that they would “look like gods, and strike the eyes of the poor 
Utopians with their splendour” (91). The Utopians were not impressed, though. When 
Utopian children began to say rude things about the outfit of an ambassador, “their mothers 
very innocently replied, ‘Hold your peace! this, I believe, is one of the ambassadors’ fools’” 
(91). 
In Utopia, education is also used proactively to nurture equality, and every man and 
woman is educated in a trade. Here too, gender tramples the ideal equality scheme. Women, 
“for the most part, deal in wool and flax, which suit best with their weakness, leaving the 
ruder trades to the men” (68). Meanwhile, all individuals are expected to learn the skills of 
agriculture and animal husbandry. Since this work is particularly difficult, family units are 
required to send half of their members every two years to labor in the countryside, after which 
the laborers may return to the city (57). 
Essential to the social scheme is the importance of family life – another significant 
limit to the conceivable. Utopians are expected to set up large households of 40 or more, with 
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a man and woman presiding as head of each extended family unit. The central position of the 
family unit helps explain the drastic penalties imposed for adultery. Similarly, pre-marital 
romantic relations are strictly punished: 
Their women are not married before eighteen nor their men before two-and-twenty, 
and if any of them run into forbidden embraces before marriage they are severely 
punished, and the privilege of marriage is denied them unless they can obtain a special 
warrant from the Prince. Such disorders cast a great reproach upon the master and 
mistress of the family in which they happen, for it is supposed that they have failed in 
their duty. The reason of punishing this so severely is, because they think that if they 
were not strictly restrained from all vagrant appetites, very few would engage in a 
state in which they venture the quiet of their whole lives, by being confined to one 
person, and are obliged to endure all the inconveniences with which it is accompanied 
(121-122) 
Here, the text tries to tackle the prescribed necessity of monogamy, as well as the problems 
with it – through sanctions and moral discourse – as experienced by the European audience 
for whom More writes.  
Amusingly, the Utopians are supposed to initiate a marriage by presenting the bride 
and groom naked, for each other’s inspection. Hythloday and his European companions laugh 
at the custom, but the Utopians are puzzled by the idea that a man, who would want to inspect 
a horse before buying it, should be enthusiastic to marry a woman after seeing only a very 
little bit of her body (122). This bizarre custom is reminiscent of European livestock 
expositions. 
Issues of cultural memory are rather scarcely registered, as opposed to social roles and 
education. In Utopia, the cultural memory is virtually non-existent, as their education system 
is evasive towards history. The whole society exists, supposedly happily, exclusively in the 
present and the near future. This is one of Utopia’s fallacies. However, the text presents an 
extended account on religion that is revealing in this respect. According to Hythloday, the 
Utopians practice a wide variety of religions; their forms of worship varying from region to 
region, and even town to town. The culture is described as remarkably open to debate over the 
ideal form of worship. Moreover, a number of the Utopians are motivated to embrace 
Christianity, after learning about it from Hythloday and his companions. There is a limit to 
this openness, however, as marked by the case of one Utopian convert to Christianity who 
began preaching that the unconverted will be condemned to Hell. For this, the converted 
Christian was banished from Utopia. Hythloday explains this by noting that Utopus, founder 
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of the Utopian nation, knew that earlier inhabitants of the island fought among themselves 
over religion, and that this had made them easy to conquer. Thus: 
After he had subdued them he made a law that every man might be of what religion he 
pleased, and might endeavour to draw others to it by the force of argument and by amicable 
and modest ways, but without bitterness against those of other opinions; but that he ought to 
use no other force but that of persuasion, and was neither to mix with it reproaches nor 
violence […] (151) 
Here the text is dealing with the toll of religious wars on Europe, and perhaps, the 
emerging humanist attempts to defend Christianity without condemning nonbelievers. At the 
same time, the passage speaks to clashing assumptions regarding life in the exotic lands of the 
New World. On the one hand, Utopians are presented as people who learn from history and 
use cultural memory to refine their practices. On the other, they are presented as people open 
to the new and willing to shed tradition with ease. In this respect, the text seems to be 
speaking less of the qualities needed to ensure a good life and a peaceful society, and more of 
the European imagination of native peoples as willing ‘blank slates.’ 
More’s depiction of Utopia supports Foucauldian notions of power and the 
pervasiveness of discourse, enacted by the knowledge within the social body. The text is 
unable to fully suspend the othering of race, restraints on sexuality and gender roles – proving 
the difficulty of stepping outside the social context Thomas More was immersed in. Placing 
the island nation outside the familiar geographic sphere, the author had the ability to create 
distance from the European socio-political environment and present a plausible imagining of a 
good place. By placing Utopia outside the systems of statements that stake a claim to what is 
desirable, knowable, and true, More was given a platform to explore the socially conceivable, 
which inevitably proved to be – nowhere.  
GEORGE ORWELL’S 1984 
With 1984 we enter fully into the realm of the dystopic novel. The extent to which the reader 
does or does not find the narrative believable no longer relies on the personal credentials of 
the narrator/reporter. It is fully dependent on the believability of the characters, their 
experiences, and their internal states. The text’s discursive elements unfold according to the 
internal logics of the plot. It is in stark contrast to Utopia, which uses plot as a device for 
systematic delivery of discourse; indicating systems of statements that construct and enact 
knowledge about human societies, with each statement making a claim concerning what is 
desirable, knowable, or true. Nor does 1984 rely on Utopia’s clever ambiguities and 
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humorous word play. Here the narrator is third-person heterodiegetic and the tone is utterly 
serious.14 From the first page, we are thrust into the life and world of Winston Smith as he 
seeks alternative truths and pursues illicit love in a totalitarian state.  
Violence, or the threat of it, is a constant in the fictive police state of Oceania. At least 
once a month the Party orchestrates public hangings of supposed enemies. Each day it 
sponsors thousands of “Two Minutes Hate” events, where citizens gather to vent their rage at 
a man named Emmanuel Goldstein. Once the chief author of Oceania’s “Ingsoc” (the 
abbreviation for “English Socialist”) ideology and a close comrade of Oceania’s ruler, Big 
Brother, Goldstein has turned against the Party and gone underground. From there he leads a 
secretive resistance movement known as the Brotherhood (or so, at least, the dominant 
narrative suggests). Though the resistance is nowhere visible in everyday life, the idea of 
Goldstein functions as an ever-present symbol of treachery and deceit – to such an extent, that 
his image is nearly as omnipresent as Big Brother’s. At a Two Minutes Hate near the start of 
the book, Winston watches as participants go into a state of frenzy, “leaping up and down in 
their places and shouting at the tops of their voices” (18). One woman – later revealed to be 
Julia, the Fiction department worker who becomes Winston’s secret lover – begins shouting, 
“Swine! Swine! Swine!” and tosses a book at the screen (18).  
Meanwhile, citizens are subject to an unescapable regime of surveillance and control. 
Party members are monitored via telescreens in their homes, so that even the things they say 
in their sleep can be analysed for signs of deviation. Approval is needed to travel more than 
100 km from one’s home, and police patrol the railway stations, checking documents and 
raising “awkward questions” for Party members, even when they travel within the 100 km 
zone (148). Couples wishing to marry must go before a special committee that only grants 
permission if they display no signs of attraction to one another, unveiling a taboo against 
sexual pleasure. It is conveyed indirectly, as a sort of aversion “rubbed into every Party 
member from childhood onwards,” as well as directly, through groups such as the Junior 
Anti-Sex League, which promote lifelong celibacy and artificial insemination as the sole 
means of procreation. “This [position], Winston was aware, was not meant altogether 
seriously, but somehow it fitted in with the general ideology of the Party” (84). 
It might be tempting to conclude that Orwell’s Oceania, with its highly centralized 
mechanisms of control, offers a contrast to Foucauldian notions of power and discourse. 
                                                          
14 Technically, the book is a satire, as Orwell himself suggested (Kellner 238). However, in terms of tone, the 
text is thoroughly serious, displaying countless details and snapshots of Winston’s thoughts, as well as 
recollections, in order to convey a sense of reality to life under conditions of extreme repression.  
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Indeed, social theorist Douglas Kellner makes this very point, noting: “power in capitalist 
societies is, as Foucault argues, diffused through different institutions, disciplines, and 
discourses that often function is much more subtle and complex ways than in the repressive 
societies of Orwell's nightmare” (232). Consequently, Kellner contends, 1984 neglects the 
“micropolitics of resistance” that emerge when power is so dispersed (232). Ultimately, he 
suggests, 1984’s vision of power and control is “quite flawed” and “should be corrected by 
the insights of contemporary social theory” (231). 
Given that 1984 responded to the threats of Nazism and Stalinism – a point that 
Kellner also acknowledges – it seems odd to fault Orwell for his focus on the totalitarian 
exercise of power. To criticise him for failing to anticipate theories that would not be 
developed for another two decades seems inappropriate. Far more importantly, Kellner seems 
to have ignored the subtle ways that 1984 in fact anticipates Foucauldian approaches.  
Oceania accomplishes widespread forms of surveillance, but it cannot arrange the total 
monitoring of its citizens. For instance, after Winston purchases his diary in the seedy second-
hand shop, he determines that he must wait at least a month before visiting the shop again. 
Even with this strategy in place, he is overcome by anxiety, knowing that there is no way to 
determine “whether the proprietor of the shop could be trusted” (Orwell 126). Winston is not 
certain whether he is being followed, or that he has ever been seen entering the shop, or that 
the shop owner is an informant. But, the very possibility of these things creates a persistent 
field of uncertainty, through which power is extended and dispersed. 
In addition, the threat of force is dispersed as well. There are public hangings 
reminiscent to pre-modern Europe. The “Two Minutes Hate” events operate differently, 
inviting citizens to become mechanisms of control themselves. Power is everywhere in this 
scenario. Nevertheless, instances of potential opposition appear – at least for brief moments. 
So, the reader learns that: 
[…] at one moment Winston’s hatred was not turned against Goldstein at all, but, on 
the contrary, against Big Brother, the Party, and the Thought Police; and at such 
moments his heart went out to the lonely, derided heretic on the screen, sole guardian 
of truth and sanity in a world of lies. And yet the very next instant he was at one with 
the people about him, and all that was said of Goldstein seemed to him to be true (19) 
At another moment Winston notices that, although Goldstein was the focus of hate at events 
held across Oceania every day – his very image provoking ecstatic frenzies of rage – his 
influence never seemed to be more present. It suggests an ongoing dialectic of power and 
resistance. 
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Here it becomes clear that discourse is paramount in Oceania; only, this is discourse at 
the extremes. At the heart of the government’s power is its ability to overturn the prior 
meanings of words and their logical, historic connections, establishing a set of seemingly 
absurd guidelines as reliable knowledge: “WAR IS PEACE. FREEDOM IS SLAVERY. 
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH” (Orwell 21, emphasis in the original). These slogans are 
etched into the edifice of the Ministry of Truth, or Minitrue. The Ministry is placed in a 
structure in the form of a stunning, white pyramid, 300-meters high, with rows of windows 
that – when the light shifts away – appear “grim as the loopholes of a fortress” (34). The 
massive architectural form of the Ministry is itself a discursive act, communicating the 
impossibility of challenge.  
 Yet this seemingly blunt ideology is not merely imposed from above. Like any 
discourse in a Foucauldian sense, it operates as an expansive system of institutionally-
generated knowledge, emanating not only from the four major state Ministries, but from other 
groups, such as the Junior Anti-Sex League, which actively supplement its content and extend 
its boundaries. The active participation and knowledge-work of individuals is also key, as 
exemplified by the character Syme. One of Winston’s colleagues at the Ministry of Truth, 
Syme is working on a new dictionary of Newspeak, the evasive and abbreviated language that 
is the lifeblood of Oceania’s institutions. Syme enthusiastically explains how the new 
dictionary will crystallize Newspeak in its definitive form, one capable of acting as a new 
language for the entire population. “We’re destroying words – scores of them, hundreds of 
them, every day,” Syme says with pride. “We’re cutting the language down to the bone” (65). 
He cannot see that Newspeak will never take on a finished form, that its raison d’être is to 
keep language in constant flux. It functions as a gatekeeping mechanism and a way to 
dislocate any sense of cultural and historical heritage that might pose a challenge to the 
state.15 Like any professional who works within the doctrines of a discourse, Syme sees only 
its promise of knowledge and progress, not its normalizing and power-laden implications. 
Here, it is useful to recall Foucault on criminological discourses, where he finds enormous 
seductive potential exerted by discourse – power is seductive.  
Social roles are intimately entangled with discourse in the state of Oceania, where one 
is either a member of the Party, or a “prole.” The text offers little insight into the life of 
                                                          
15 In this context of extreme discursive control, even seemingly harmless uses of language can represent 
moments of resistance and the seeds of counter-discourse. So, for instance, the shopkeeper Carrington hums an 
old nursery rhyme for Winston: “Oranges and lemons say the bells of St. Clemens […]” After hearing this 
fragment of pre-Oceania cultural knowledge, Winston concludes, “you had the illusion of actually hearing bells, 
the bells of a lost London that still existed somewhere or other” (126). 
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proles, but it appears they are primarily distinguished by their relative distance from the sites 
where knowledge is produced. They are also portrayed as easy-going consumers of cultural 
products that reflect and carry state discourses. For instance, Winston notes how a new “Hate 
Song” has become pervasive because, “[t]he proles had taken a fancy to it, and in the 
midnight streets it competed with the still-popular ‘It was only a hopeless fancy’” (187). Party 
members, by contrast, serve the four major bureaucracies of Oceania – the Ministry of Peace, 
the Ministry of Truth, the Ministry of Love, and the Ministry of Plenty (273) – propagating 
and putting into action the discourses they produce.  
How well a member “carries” these discourses can determine their status, or even their 
fate. For instance, much of Oceania seems to take only sporadic notice of pronouncements by 
the Ministry of Peace (which functions as the Ministry of War), and “it is in the ranks of the 
Party, and above all of the Inner Party, that the true war enthusiasm is found” (272). Yet 
enthusiastic belief is by no means a requirement for maintaining one’s job and social position, 
as illustrated by the character Julia, Winston’s illicit lover. Julia does not share Winston’s 
strong need to struggle against Oceania’s structure of official knowledge. She simply 
possesses a deep-seated sensuality that drives her to risk physical intimacy despite the state’s 
counter-erotic stance. (As Winston sarcastically remarks, “You’re only a rebel from the waist 
downwards” [196].) Aside from her sensuality, Julia is a competent manager of her social 
role. She fulfils her job in the Fiction department, gladly takes part in Two Minutes Hates, and 
casually ignores Winston’s attempts at exposing Party fabrications. “Talking to her, [Winston] 
realized how easy it was to present an appearance of orthodoxy while having no grasp 
whatever of what orthodoxy meant,” and in this, the text implies that she is hardly unique in 
her relationship to the state (196-197). Although not completely brainwashed subjects, Party 
members such as Julia apathetically use dominant discourses as a routine part of their jobs and 
their social roles.  
Winston is convinced, however, that the secret to resistance – and freedom – lies in 
determining and articulating a cohesive counter-discourse. In this regard, he faces an uphill 
battle. The problem is not simply that certain maxims of Ingsoc ideology are literally etched 
in stone and voiced by nearly all those around him; whether out of professional pride, a sense 
of their social roles, a desire to survive, or simply fear. But in Oceania, the function of 
knowledge production is to disrupt the certainty of knowledge, to defeat cultural and 
historical memory, and render the accumulation of continuous collective memory impossible. 
Winston works at the Ministry of Truth continuously ‘rectifying’ news accounts. For instance, 
when Big Brother delivers an inaccurate prediction, Winston receives instructions to alter 
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newspaper coverage, in order to bring the reported prediction in line with actual events. 
Minitrue workers apply similar methods to every form of communication, including posters, 
photos, films, and even cartoons. Thus, “[d]ay by day and almost minute by minute the past 
was brought up to date” (51). Even abbreviations like Minitrue are consciously engineered to 
disrupt any potential association with past words which might evoke cultural memory or 
counter-knowledge: 
[T]he associations called up by a word like MINITRUE are fewer and more 
controllable than those called up by MINISTRY OF TRUTH. This accounted not only 
for the habit of abbreviating whenever possible, but also for the almost exaggerated 
care that was taken to make every word easily pronounceable (387) 
Education functions as a source for the constant reshaping of memory. At one point, 
Julia naively repeats the fact that the Party invented the airplane. Winston is certain this is 
false. He is older than Julia and recalls that, when he was a student, it was only the helicopter 
that the Party claimed to have invented. He suspects, the Party will teach the next generation 
children that it invented the steam engine. Yet, “when he told her that aeroplanes had been in 
existence before he was born and long before the Revolution, the fact struck her as totally 
uninteresting” (193). In an atmosphere of continuously shifting knowledge, real knowledge 
has no firm ground to be planted and to flourish – discourse itself is paramount. Education 
filtered by dominant state discourses reshapes history in its own image. History is nothing 
more than “a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a 
model […] of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by 
representing them” (White 2, emphasis in the original). 
For this reason, Winston becomes obsessed with the hope of obtaining a copy of an 
underground tract. It is referred to simply as “the book,” that is supposed to have been written 
by Goldstein. The book is used to induct new members of the Brotherhood, and – according 
to O’Brien, the man whom Winston comes to know as a Brotherhood member – its potential 
for disrupting state-produced knowledge is so significant, Oceania’s Thought Police are 
constantly involved in tracking down and destroying copies of it. Yet, O’Brien assures him, 
“The book is indestructible. If the last copy were gone, we could reproduce it almost word for 
word” (224). The assurance resonates with Winston’s hope that alternative systems of 
knowledge not only exist but are guaranteed continuity through their life within a community. 
Almost by definition, the individual’s alternative knowledge represents a form of madness, 
though alternative knowledge shared among a network of individuals represents a true 
counter-discourse, a point of resistance. 
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Here we learn a crucial aspect about how the novel itself operates as a discursive 
artefact. It reveals a point of resemblance to the utopian travel narratives such as More’s. In 
Utopia a chain of acquaintances (More to Giles to Hythloday) leads us into the discursive 
heart of the text: a systematic exposition and “tour” of a fantastic society. In 1984, a chain of 
subtle cues leads Winston to gradually place trust in the figure of O’Brien, leading us to the 
discursive heart of the novel: a systematic exposition and tour of Ingsoc ideology – in the 
form of Goldstein’s book. For Winston, the book is the holy grail of sanity and resistance, a 
confirmation of all that he suspects about truth and knowledge in Oceania. “In a sense,” the 
text remarks: 
it told him nothing that was new, but that was part of the attraction. It said what he 
would have said, if it had been possible for him to set his scattered thoughts in order. 
It was the product of a mind similar to his own, but enormously more powerful, more 
systematic, less fear-ridden. The best books, he perceived, are those that tell you what 
you know already (252-253) 
Here, for instance, Winston receives confirmation that the world of Oceania is: 
[a] bare, hungry, dilapidated place compared with the world that existed before [the 
revolution that brought the Party to power], and still more so if compared with the 
imaginary future to which the people of that period looked forward (238)  
Science and technology do not serve collective advancement but are employed solely 
to aid the perpetual pursuit of war. In turn, perpetual war has become a mechanism for 
consuming surplus production and ensuring that the standard of living never rises above a 
basic level. Through this policy, Winston learns the goals of Oceania and the two other mega 
states with which it perpetually battles. It is turning from one enemy to another so frequently 
that the notion of “the enemy” becomes blurred. Thus, despite all the many cues that Oceania 
is modelled on Soviet society, we come to realize that 1984 is not a would-be manifest against 
either capitalism or communism. Rather, it strives to be a warning of the extremes that can 
emerge as governments seek to impose control over vast and educated populations. Finally, 
1984 is also a contemplation on the power and failings of language. 
In the end, of course, we learn that O’Brien is no resistance fighter, but rather an agent 
of the state, and both Winston and Julia are doomed. During his torture and reconditioning, 
O’Brien visits Winston, and Winston asks him about the book. O’Brien reveals that he wrote 
the book, along with other Party members. Its ‘secret knowledge’ is nothing more than what 
its authors knew people like Winston already believed. Nevertheless, O’Brien also admits that 
the book’s description of how Oceania came to consolidate its power is true. It possibly 
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suggests that, if individuals such as Winston trusted more to their own memories and 
understanding of reality, rather than allowing themselves to be seduced by the discourses of 
power, with all their promises of progress and knowledge, something like resistance would be 
possible.  
Ultimately, the dystopian vision of 1984 leaves little hope for resistance. Nevertheless, 
what little hope it offers seems to be related to bonds of love and friendship that has the 
potential to emancipate individuals to act in noble and irrational ways. There is the potentially 
subversive power of Winston and Julia’s love. There is the empowerment of camaraderie, 
represented by the regretfully fictive Brotherhood. Human connections paved the path to 
Winston’s tragedy, though, just as well, they could have been the source of salvation as well. 
In Foucauldian perspective, human connections have the theoretical capacity to establish a 
counter-discourse, to create an intellectual alternative with the ability of “counterposing” 
power (“Truth and Power” 128). Foucault sees resistance as an intellectual mode of action, as 
the resistance is a “battle ‘for truth’, or at least ‘around truth’ – […] by truth I do not mean 
‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’, but rather ‘the ensemble of 
rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power 
attached to the true’” (“Truth and Power” 132). The reason Winston’s resistance failed lies in 
the origin of the alternative knowledge he relied on; the book he trusted is not the origin of 
counter-discourse, but, in fact, the artefact of the prevailing discourse. The alternative truth 
was a chimera, an extended arm of the Party truth, and the source of his demise.  
ALDOUS HUXLEY’S BRAVE NEW WORLD 
In a sense, Brave New World creates a circuit with Utopia and 1984. Like 1984, Brave New 
World is a novel that explores a dystopic scenario of total state control. However, it shares the 
playful tone and ambiguity of Utopia, employing a manner of writing that is, at times, 
matching satire. Like 1984, the plot leads to an immersion into a distinct system of 
knowledge, where all the principles of the state are inverted. However, rather than leading to a 
resistance manifesto as 1984, it leads to the tour of a primitive space, thereby resonating with 
Utopia. 
  In Brave New World, a near-total world domination is achieved through control of 
procreation, which occurs exclusively in laboratories. Extensive thought conditioning is 
employed in infants and children, who are raised in collective facilities. The inspiration for 
this efficient assembly-line production of individuals traces directly to Henry Ford, who is 
treated as the sole deity of the new World State. Rather than “Our Lord,” people instinctively 
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invoke “Our Ford,” and the introduction of the Model T is apparently taken as year one of the 
World State’s new history. 
Inequality and class divisions – which have mostly been erased in Utopia through the 
elimination of private property, and which are kept at bay in Oceania through the pursuit of 
perpetual war – are here resolved through a systematic genetic engineering of individuals in 
uniform batches, ranging from Alphas, who are destined to take part in the mechanisms of 
state control, to Epsilons, destined to perform manual labour. Epsilons are produced by 
depriving them of oxygen in their embryonic state, and embryos destined to become tropical 
laborers are given x-rays when exposed to cool temperatures, in order to develop individuals 
with inherent intolerance for cold. All classes of infants then undergo intensive neo-Pavlovian 
conditioning, in order to ensure, for example, that they grow up with an instinctive dislike of 
books, if books are not meant to be part of their adult social roles. 
In 1984, Party members are monitored in their sleep, in case things they say in their 
sleep give up signs of deviant tendencies. In Brave New World, sleep is used as an optimal 
time to implant subconscious messages concerning social roles. So, for instance, Beta infants 
hear a message on a continuous loop that reinforces the advantages of their future class 
position: 
Alpha children wear grey. They work much harder than we do, because they’re so 
frightfully clever. I’m really awfully glad I’m a Beta, because I don’t work so hard. 
And then we are much better than the Gammas and Deltas. Gammas are stupid. They 
all wear green […] (21)  
As a result, discourses of the state become hardwired in developing brains. At one 
point in the novel, one of the central characters Lenina becomes troubled, thinking about the 
lives of Epsilons. Then she recalls the soothing recording concerning her place as an Alpha, 
which she heard whenever she woke in the night as a child. With this, her sense of the ‘natural 
order’ returns: “‘I’m glad I’m not an Epsilon,’ said Lenina, with conviction” (50). Henry, the 
man she is with, responds by reminding her that Epsilons similarly feel thankful not to be 
Alphas or Betas. As the London Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning remarks to his 
students, “that is the secret of happiness and virtue—liking what you’ve got to do” (13). 
 The erasure of cultural memory reinforces this contentment. Establishment of the 
World State involved a “campaign against the Past,” including the destruction of museums 
and monuments (36). All old books were banned, in part (as we learn towards the end of the 
book, when a senior state Controller describes the ideological underpinnings of the Fordist 
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order) because the beauty of so many old literary works hinged on conflict and tragedy, which 
the state supposedly has eradicated.  
Education completes the erasure. Speaking to the London crop of students, the 
Controller says, “‘you all remember, I suppose, that beautiful and inspired saying of Our 
Ford’s: History is bunk. History,’ he repeated slowly, ‘is bunk’” (26). In particular, children 
learn nothing of family life in earlier eras. Chunks of information concerning nuclear family 
life (which no longer exists) can be used to shock and horrify. 
However, rather than suppressing the erotic, the World State promotes it ceaselessly, 
through ever-present pornographic “feelies” (films that incorporate a sense of touch), 
requirements to take part in weekly orgies, and a free supply of the drug known as soma, 
which is often taken during sex. Still, multiple levels of ideology, cultural practice, and 
medical intervention support a strict separation of sex from both reproduction and romance. 
Women of childbearing age are kept in a constant state of infertility, and ‘coupling’ is utterly 
taboo.  
In fact, one of the central tensions of the book is Lenina’s growing attachment to 
Henry. In a locker room scene, Lenina tells her friend, Fanny, that she has been feeling 
slightly off – so much so that her doctor has recommended that she takes her first Pregnancy 
Substitute earlier than most young women, in order to help her calm down. “‘I hadn’t been 
feeling very keen on promiscuity lately,’” Lenina admits. “Fanny nodded her sympathy and 
understanding. ‘But one’s got to make the effort,’ she said sententiously, ‘one’s got to play 
the game. After all, everyone belongs to everyone else’” (31). This last phrase, “everyone 
belongs to everyone else,” is in fact one of the mantras that all children hear 62,000 times in 
their sleep, conditioning them to believe that sexual intimacy should be shared without 
restrictions.  
Thus, control is achieved in the new World State through the extensive and efficient 
exercise of the pleasure principle. This becomes especially clear through the character of 
Bernard Marx, an Alpha whose out-of-standard behaviour and ideas initiate the rumour that 
he was accidentally oxygen-deprived at birth. Through Bernard, the text suggests that natural 
impulses continue to reside under the surface of conditioning, and that among these are a 
man’s feelings of protectiveness and jealousy for the woman he desires. Marx is attracted to 
Lenina, but instead of simply asking her to have sex – to which she doubtlessly would agree – 
he takes her to a romantic spot and attempts to have a meaningful talk with her, even sharing 
his dangerous ideas of personal freedom. Lenina is confused and distressed. More than 
anything, she cannot comprehend why they are not simply having sex. “‘Everyone says I’m 
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awfully pneumatic,’” she flirts, using the industrial word used for attractive women. Bernard 
agrees, but it pains him that Lenina thinks of herself as “meat” (62). Due to what the text 
suggests is an atavistic streak of normalcy, Bernard yearns to know one woman well, to 
protect her from even her own instincts, and to delay having sex so that passion can build. For 
this kind of behaviour, his Director criticizes him strongly, threatening to relocate Bernard to 
Iceland (one of the few territories outside of state control) if he continues to fail to 
demonstrate the “proper standard of infantile decorum” in his life outside work (66). 
For Kellner, “Aldous Huxley's vision of a pleasantly manipulative society in Brave 
New World provides a more salient vision of how contemporary capitalist societies function 
than Orwell's nightmare of totalitarian horror” (230). However, Kellner appears to overlook 
that modern capitalism fosters compliance (and consumption) mostly through imperative, as 
well as hollow, discourses of individualism, identity, and differentiation – and it casually 
explains economic distress in corresponding fashion, through discourses of poor individual 
choice. So, labelling the ideologies of the World State as discourse may not be entirely 
correct, since individuals are biologically engineered and psychologically conditioned to 
accept the canons of the state. If the extreme coercion of 1984 emerges most clearly at the end 
of the novel, when Winston is tortured and brainwashed, until he famously accepts that 2 + 2 
= 5, in Brave New World the torture and brainwashing takes place in the initial stages, the first 
few years of life, including the embryonic stage. The central characters are adults, who have 
already been fully formatted and developed.  
It is difficult to conclude that the character of Bernard represents a model for 
resistance against the state of Brave New World. This becomes clearest when Bernard takes 
Lenina to the former American Southwest, in order to vacation on one of the “Savage 
Reservations,” where people continue to live outside the efficiency-driven structures of the 
new state. Special permission from the Director is needed to travel there, and the reservation 
is surrounded by an electrified fence. The text makes clear that this is a voyage into otherness, 
and potentially a journey to utopia within dystopia.  
However, it quickly becomes clear that there is little promise of redemption in so-
called savage societies. Both Bernard and Lenina are discouraged by the filth, poverty, and 
lack of technology and education to be found there among a population dominated by Native 
Americans. Lenina is horrified to find that the people of the reservation age, and her horror is 
magnified by the fact that they are dark-skinned: 
An almost naked Indian was very slowly climbing down the ladder from the first-floor 
terrace of a neighbouring house-rung after rung, with the tremulous caution of extreme 
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old age. His face was profoundly wrinkled and black, like a mask of obsidian. The 
toothless mouth had fallen in. At the corners of the lips, and on each side of the chin, a 
few long bristles gleamed almost white against the dark skin (75) 
Thus, while the text prepares us for an inversion of the idea of the savage, in the end it shifts 
to basic stereotypes of native people as impoverished, illiterate, and brutal. 
Bernard discoveries that, unlike the Ford deity who demands his followers to pursue 
efficient and rationalized pleasure, the people of the reservation worship Christ who demands 
irrational sacrifice, self-abnegation, and pain. He befriends John, the son of a Beta woman 
named Linda who was left stranded and pregnant on the reservation decades ago by the 
Director. He learns from John that the reservation life is marked by an insistent pressure to 
conform, just like the life in London, and that both John and his mother were cruelly 
ostracized because she did not practice monogamy. Linda herself dreams of the order, 
cleanliness, promiscuity, and advanced technology of the World State. Whether this is 
because her conditioning makes it impossible to adjust, or because she really prefers her old 
life, it is impossible to say. Bernard and John bond, although, not over a shared vision of 
freedom and identity, but merely over the shared pain of being different. 
Ultimately, Bernard gains permission to bring John and Linda back to London – 
though he brings them back as interesting specimens, rather than as friends. This venture is 
reminiscent of the tradition of European voyagers who brought indigenous people back with 
them as oddities to be paraded. Bernard does not hesitate to enjoy the minor celebrity rank he 
achieves by doing so:  
Success went fizzily to Bernard’s head, and in the process completely reconciled him 
(as any good intoxicant should) to a world which, up till then, he had found very 
unsatisfactory. In so far as it recognized him as important, the order of things was 
good. But . . . he yet refused to forego the privilege of criticizing this order. For the act 
of criticizing heightened his sense of importance […] (105) 
Ironically, Lenina likes him now more than she ever did before, but Bernard – feeling 
emboldened – embraces promiscuity. 
 John alternates between painful emotions of longing for Lenina and sessions of self-
flagellation in which he calls out “strumpet” (175). And through his self-flagellation, he 
initiates a craze among London Alphas. Indeed, they attach none of John’s religious aspects to 
the practice, but experiencing pleasure all their lives, they seem to have discovered a new 
faucet of pleasure in pain. Eventually, the pressure leads John to hang himself. 
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 If there is any glimmer of hope for escape from dystopia, the text offers it in the form 
of the Controller’s decision to exile Bernard and a minor character named Watson, to one of 
the few territories ungoverned by the state. Bernard is disappointed and has to be carried from 
the room and soma-tized. Watson remains with the Controller, who comments that if Bernard 
were wiser, he’d know that this was actually a sort of a reward – being sent to a place filled by 
“people who aren’t satisfied with orthodoxy, who’ve got independent ideas of their own” 
(155). 
 The place Bernard is exiled to turns out to be an island, entirely detached from known 
centres of power and politics. The prospect is given to cut ties from the system of discourse he 
was struggling to completely accept. The subversiveness of his actions, in the form of shy 
attempts to disperse alternative knowledge, creates an opportunity for casting away his New 
World identity and assuming a new one. Instead of appreciating the possibility, Bernard is 
petrified. He realises he “is the product of a relation of power” exercised time and time again, 
over his lifetime, and his current discourse environment is the very confirmation of his being 
(“Questions on Geography” 74). In abandoning the power/knowledge/truth system, Bernard 
sees the erasure of his entire persona. Viewed in this light, the total resistance to discourse 
may come at the expense of expunging oneself from the public world – becoming nobody. At 
the end, we are inescapably returned to More’s Utopia, its social otherness potential and the 
inviting idea of a land that is, by definition, really nowhere. 
SHARED UTOPIC/DYSTOPIC DISCOURSE IN THE THREE TEXTS 
Utopia, 1984, and Brave New World were all produced by notable intellectuals of their times. 
Thomas More was a prominent English defender of Catholicism, later sainted by the Catholic 
church. He was an active participant in politics, who served in Parliament, and a friend to 
other distinguished intellectuals of the time, including Erasmus (“Thomas More Biography” 
n. p.). George Orwell (born Eric Arthur Blair) built his reputation as both a novelist and war 
reporter, who famously travelled to Spain to aid the fight against Franco’s forces in the 
Spanish Civil war. Later, he became a BBC producer, thereby cementing his role as public 
intellectual. Orwell authored not one, but two allegorical and dystopian political novels, 1984 
and Animal Farm, whose worldwide readerships continue to this day (“George Orwell 
Biography” n. p.). Aldous Huxley was born to a prominent intellectual family that included 
one of England’s earliest and best-known advocates of Darwinian theory. He established 
himself as a writer early in life; and socialized with the likes of Virginia Woolf, Bertrand 
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Russell and T.S. Eliot, gaining a reputation as “one of the most significant minds in England” 
at the time (“Aldous Huxley Biography” n. p.).  
The texts considered here added neologisms and new concepts to the collective 
vocabularies through which we imagine social life and political possibilities. The date 1984 
has become a pervasive reference to totalitarianism and thought control. The idea of a brave 
new world is invoked whenever new technology emerges with the overwhelming potential for 
reshaping human life. And Utopia introduced a universal term for the imagination of social 
perfection. These facts alone suggest that, more than merely a genre, utopian/dystopian 
writings constitute an evolving discourse, rooted not in institutions such as medicine or social 
work, but in the special sphere of social and political influence. As with all discourses, what 
these texts take for granted is as important as what they appear to proclaim. As Bové notes, 
common sense is discourse that has achieved “the privilege of unnoticed power” (54). With 
Bové’s notion in mind, three observations emerge: the significance of gender and sexuality, 
the invisibility of race and the transience of hope.  
In the discourse of the socially conceivable, gender and sexuality (along with related 
issues of eroticism, procreation, family life) arise as the most consistent unifying force. In 
Utopia’s imagination of a potentially ideal state, social stability depends on the formation of 
extended households, each overseen by a single, married heterosexual couple. The book 
suggests that these couples are attracted to one another, since it is unthinkable that they would 
marry without first seeing each other fully nude. (The Utopians wonder at the “folly of the 
men of all other nations, who, if they are but to buy a horse of a small value, are so cautious 
that they will see every part of him,” but are willing to marry a woman without first 
inspecting her body [More 128].), While physical attraction holds importance in sanctioned 
relationships, both pre-marital sex and infidelity are treated as serious crimes and are carefully 
controlled and kept in check. The importance of marital stability is particularly evident among 
couples that lead households, for they are expected to act as extensions of state power. They 
are entrusted with keeping order in their spheres of influence by, for instance, ensuring that 
young people do not engage in pre-marital sex and deciding who should be sent to the 
countryside every two years to fulfil the household’s agrarian work quota. The text goes into 
detail about how equality is maintained among family units, yet no attention is given to 
equality within them. The family unit is both a social foundation and a black box. 
Several centuries later, we see the family problematic emerge in dystopic visions of 
state control. Brave New World basically functions as an inversion of Utopia in this respect. 
Lasting stability in Utopia is achieved through the maintenance of firm family units, while in 
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Huxley’s new World State authoritarian control is achieved by separating the links of 
romantic coupling, procreation, and family life. The Controller shocks and horrifies a group 
of young Alpha adults by entertaining them with descriptions of family life before the World 
State (a topic that they are forbidden to study in school). The family home, he tells them, was 
a rabbit hole, a dump, reeking with emotion: 
What suffocating intimacies, what dangerous, insane, obscene relationships between 
the members of the family group! Maniacally, the mother brooded over her children 
(her children). Brooded over them like a cat over its kittens; but a cat that could talk, a 
cat that could say, “My baby, my baby,” over and over again. “My baby, and oh, oh, 
at my breast, the little hands, the hunger, and that unspeakable agonizing pleasure! Till 
at last my baby sleeps, my baby sleeps with a bubble of white milk at the corner of his 
mouth.” (28) 
This is a form of satire, meant to amuse with its bizarre take on family bonds that are 
typically cherished. The implication Brave New World addresses is clear: the private family 
unit functions as a natural barrier against overweening state power. The control of male-
female desire is likewise key to state control. Although, the new World State tries not to 
repress sexual energies, but to ensure they flourish and are dispersed. Hence, orgies are a 
routine part of civic duty. The assumption – one that articulates both with Utopia’s careful 
controlling of sexual desire as well as Oceania’s attempt to eliminate it – is that social 
stability and the erotic impulse are explicitly interconnected. 
Though Brave New World imagines a state where women are entirely freed from 
monogamy, procreation, and mothering, it is unable to imagine that anything has been altered 
in the romantic feelings of either men or women. The girl talk between Lenina and Polly 
reveals that they treat promiscuity as a duty at times when it does not seem pleasurable. They 
are deeply concerned with their attractiveness and pleased when men desire them. At the same 
time, chunks of guy talk in the book suggest that men are largely concerned with identifying 
which women are most pneumatic and should be taken as a sexual partner. It is up to a male 
character, Bernard, to feel outraged that the woman he is attracted to views herself as “meat” 
(Huxley 62). However, even Bernard, who was apparently oxygen-deprived as an embryo and 
therefore strays from the Alpha mould, appears to be attracted to Lenina chiefly for her looks. 
Bernard harbours dangerous thoughts of his own and is frustrated when Lenina does not 
behave as an interested and dazzled audience. Yet, once he gains a bit of fame, Bernard 
begins to pursue sex freely. Lenina is left to pine for him; though at no point does she grapple 
with the larger, philosophical issues at play; none of the female characters do. As the only 
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female character presented with any depth, Lenina is a more instinctual then intellectual 
person. She is led both by the artificial instincts bred into her by the state and by the atavistic 
inclinations, such as the desire to have one man’s attentions focused solely on her, that surface 
within her.  
In 1984, the state seeks to obliterate, rather than disperse, the erotic impulse. Yet, the 
achieved outcome is similar – preventing the formation of strong male-female relationships 
and traditional family units. As in Brave New World, the discourses of Oceania have created 
horror stories out of the anachronistic family unit, particularly its irrational and inherent 
loyalties. By repressing romance and desire, Oceania can more easily channel its citizens’ 
energies into violence. This is a central differential aspect from Brave New World, which 
rules through a carefully prescribed regime of happiness. However, despite their strikingly 
divergent visions of dystopia, they share the fundamental premise that the spheres of male-
female romance and traditional family life represent important barriers against state power, 
and that power is closely linked to control of the erotic impulse. 
Above all, they share a strikingly traditional view of gender roles. In 1984, Winston is 
the isolated dissenter, hungry for connection. He is a much different character than Bernard 
and the novel treats him with a far more sympathetic tone. Still, like Bernard, he is 
disappointed in his lover’s inability to understand dissent through a shared perspective. Julia, 
like Lenina, is a creature of impulse, driven by desire to violate the pervasive taboo against 
romance. Winston is a rationalist, who seeks a systematic understanding of oppression; Julia 
is emotional and seeks to evade the forces of oppression only to the extent that it enables her 
to find intimacy and pleasure with the man she loves. As in Brave New World, no other 
female character is well-developed. Meanwhile, neither of these modern visions concerns 
itself with non-heteronormative sexualities, or considers whether they might act as a lever, 
either of control or resistance. It comes as no surprise that Utopia is mute on the subject. 
Here, within the discourse of the socially conceivable, gender and sexuality are presented as 
commonsensical, natural categories that allow no reimagining.     
 If gender and sexuality are central to the utopian/dystopian discursive project, race is 
kept on the side lines. Utopia is premised on a supposed encounter between European 
travellers and an other race, articulating with accounts of actual voyages to the New World. In 
this sense, it might seem that issues of race are central to the text. Yet the fictional Utopians 
seem to be a mere excuse for the text’s attempt to reflect upon European politics and 
emerging struggles.  
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The essential function of race remains unchanged when utopian/dystopian discourse 
enters the 20th century. In both 1984 and Brave New World, non-white individuals rarely 
appear. The breakdown of social structures forms a binary – us vs. them – gap. In this context, 
the challenges of everyman, embodied in the protagonist placed in a dystopian milieu, 
substitute traditional social and racial divisions. Nevertheless, the issue of race, no matter how 
marginal when brought to attention, is often dappled with stereotypes – reflecting the 
inevitable socio-cultural setting these texts were created in. 
When non-white characters are present, they are used as a background motif to white 
characters and their concerns. In Oceania, we learn that one of the three mega-states is 
Eurasia. Because the three states must continually be at war, in order to pacify their own 
populations, Eurasia functions exclusively as a feared other, used by the state to channel 
aggression. There is only one point in the text where the reader encounters actual non-white 
people, and this is when Winston sees a row of transport vehicles carrying Eurasian prisoners 
of war. He observes: “Their sad, Mongolian faces gazed out over the sides of the trucks 
utterly incurious” (145). Thus, the text calmly reproduces the stereotype of the inscrutable 
Oriental. 
In Brave New World, there is a reference to race early on, when the London Director 
of Hatcheries is touring the lab with his students. At one point, a student asks for the record 
number of individuals produced from one human ovary. The Director notes that 16,012 is the 
general limit (produced in 189 “batches”). “Mombasa,” he notes, “has actually touched the 
seventeen thousand mark. But then they have unfair advantages. You should see the way a 
negro ovary responds to pituitary! It’s quite astonishing, when you’re used to working with 
European material” (8). Within the satirical context of fictional science, the text skilfully 
manages to highlight the stereotype of black hyper-fertility and introduce it as fact. 
The new regime of industrial procreation is a worldwide endeavour, so it clearly must 
involve extensive non-white populations. However, it is unclear whether Alphas are always 
white. The Controller, presented as the only character reflecting meaningfully on the new 
world system, is “black-haired, with a hooked nose, full red lips, eyes very piercing and dark” 
(25). Yet, the racial reference here is unclear. To be fair, there are few mentions of non-white 
individuals, but all of these are either members of the lower castes or residents of the Savage 
Reservation. Moreover, each such mention is used to underline feelings of fear or contempt 
among the book’s central (white) Alpha characters. For instance, when Bernard goes to the 
hangars to retrieve his flying machine, he pulls away from the twin Delta-Minus attendants, 
who are “identically small, black and hideous” (43). Lenina similarly flinches at the sight of 
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the elderly, dark-skinned man on the Savage Reservation, and both Bernard and she are 
shocked by the poverty and uncleanliness in which the mostly non-white people of the 
reservation live. John, the only resident of the reservation whom either of them befriends, is 
actually white. Ironically, he has lived his life as a bullied outsider – embodying the other to 
the residents of the reservation. 
As with Utopia and 1984, race in Brave New World is the matter devoid of conceptual 
dimension. Race is undeniably one of the central axes of both power and conflict in the 
modern world, yet utopian/dystopian discourse seems unable, or unwilling, to cope with it. 
Utopia, as an early modern text, is premised entirely on the idea of contact with non-
Europeans. Yet, this idea functions merely as a screen against which European political and 
social ideas are projected. As twentieth century texts, Brave New World and 1984 invoke race 
only sporadically, as a minor contrast, in order to expose the feelings and ideas of central, 
white, European characters. And though each novel contains racial stereotypes, neither 
bothers to explore race systematically enough to propose what race means to either dystopia 
or resistance. Where gender and sexuality cannot be reimagined because they are too 
fundamental, race cannot be reimagined because it is too marginal to the reimagining power 
of white, English authors.  
However, the most important aspect of the discourse is the transience of hope – hope 
for social improvement, hope for avoiding disaster, hope for resistance against oppression. It 
is the universal anticipation of a better life, and ultimately, a better world. The image of future 
perfect states is reflected in the impulse of anticipation which “operates in the field of hope; 
so this hope is not taken only as emotion […], but more essentially as a directing act of a 
cognitive kind” (Bloch 12, emphasis in the original). Thoughts of resistance are seeds of 
counter-discourse, the one that stems from “[t]he imagination and the thoughts of future 
intention,” opening the possibility of utopia (Bloch 12). But, on one hand, Utopia offers the 
vision of an amiable, just society full of prospect for human fulfilment; on the other, the 
vision of a single small island, surrounded by less stable and peaceful neighbours causes 
uncertainty with which the potential should be viewed. The idea almost retracts itself, as the 
fragility of utopia becomes apparent.  
Violence is key to the erosion of hope in the 20th-century discourse. The dystopian 
regimes of 1984 and Brave New World both emerged in the aftermath of devastating wars, 
allowing total state control to appear as an attractive option – even at the price of sacrificing 
individual freedom. The novels contain only the smallest hints of how resistance to dystopia 
might be possible. In 1984, we are left with the possibility that hope may lie in the sphere of 
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interpersonal trust and friendship. Ultimately, these turn out to be the source of Winston’s 
demise. Brave New World suggests only the possibility for small groups of nonconformists. If 
left alone on little islands, they might find a way to forge better, braver new social orders of 
their own. Intriguingly, both texts put hope in the smallest of social units – the subversive 
individual, friendship, family, close-knit community. But the sheer scale of challenges these 
novels grapple with is immense: how to manage the vast populations of a modern, globalizing 
world? How to regulate their consumption and assign social roles? How to build something 
new on the foundations of societies that have become desensitised to violence and inequality? 
In this sense, utopian/dystopian discourse may act less to diagnose society, issue prophetic 
warnings, or form perceptions for new possibilities. Instead, it may primarily function as a 
discourse of the political status quo. 
CONCLUSION 
If More’s Utopia announced the arrival of a genre, 1984 and Brave New World possibly 
represented the genre’s modernist apex. Indeed, the titles of all three works have become 
firmly entrenched in common language. The first is routinely used to describe a state of social 
tranquillity and individual fulfilment that is unachievable, while the other two serve as 
shorthand references to future states of totalitarian control that may be looming just over the 
horizon. While utopia seems always beyond reach, dystopia seems always just about to arrive. 
 Given their places in the literary canon, as well as the extent of debate they have 
provoked, it is tempting to conclude that these three works reflect bold interventions in the 
collective imagining of the socially conceivable. Yet when removed from authorial intent 
debates and read as parts of an evolving discourse, their value appears largely normative. For 
instance, all three rely on heterosexual coupling as the base of social order. In Utopia, strong 
heterosexual heads of household provide the basic framework for social tranquillity, while in 
both 1984 and Brave New World, totalitarian control operates through the repression of 
romantic, heterosexual coupling.  
All three texts use race to introduce the other and make their characters’ reactions 
seem ‘authentic.’ Yet none of these texts brings race to the surface or reflects on it directly. 
Utopia serves to develop a European fantasy of the exotic, native ‘other.’ 1984 uses that 
fantasy’s downside to help make sense of citizens’ allegiance to Big Brother. Brave New 
World experiments sporadically in both fantasies of, and repugnance at, ethnic others. 
However, race is never placed in the foreground. This too reflects a normative, Euro-centric 
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stance: valuing race as a background, yet avoiding recognition of race as a point of social 
experience.  
Finally, none of the texts allow social change. Utopia ensures that the premise of 
imagined social alternatives cannot be taken too seriously, both by naming its fictive island a 
no-place and by emersion in multiple ambiguities. Both 1984 and Brave New World offer 
apparently sharp critiques of emergent political and scientific tendencies, yet neither envisions 
possibilities of genuine resistance. It stops at intimate relations or the subversive thinking of a 
handful of individuals. Resistance, in both scenarios, is more or less futile. Viewed in this 
light, these three utopian/dystopian texts serve mainly to strengthen and emphasise the social 
and political status quo, rather than open perspectives onto radically new imaginings. 
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Abstract 
This paper proposes that utopian/dystopian writing should be understood as 
contributions to an ongoing discourse of the socially conceivable. After determining the 
utopian genre historically and establishing the relevance of Foucauldian discourse to the study 
of utopian/dystopian literature, the paper provides a discursive reading of Thomas More’s 
Utopia, George Orwell’s 1984, and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. These readings 
explore both the discursive functions of each text, as well as the functions of discourse within 
each different social order portrayed; focusing attention to discourses of social roles, 
education, and history. In conclusion, the paper treats the three texts not as separate 
contributions to a genre, but as elements of a continuous discourse. Although unbalanced and 
evolving, the discourse serves to map the boundaries of the social imagination – the socially 
perfected conditions, or dystopic inversions, that can or ‘should’ be imagined; hope for 
restitution and possibility for societies gone horribly wrong; and the inevitable forces 
involved in encouraging progress or hindering it. Considered in this manner, three 
observations emerge. The discourse of utopia/dystopia place gender and sexuality as principal 
forces of social stability and suggests that their manipulation is essential to maintaining 
alternate social orders. By contrast, the role of race in social context can neither be completely 
acknowledged nor challenged within the classic, Eurocentric utopian/dystopian writings. 
Thus, race is reduced to the margins, establishing it as a ‘normal,’ almost trivial category.  
Finally, while the discourse proposes systemic understandings and critiques of alternative 
social orders, it offers only transient, individualistic accounts of resistance or social change. In 
this sense, while utopic/dystopic texts are often viewed as socially and politically engaging 
tracts, ultimately, the discourse serves to endorse the social and political status quo. 
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